TL;DR
- The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has designated Xinbi, a major Chinese-language illicit guarantee marketplace. The designation signals a strategic shift toward targeting the underlying financial ‘escrow backbone’ that sustains large-scale scam ecosystems rather than focusing solely on individual perpetrators.
- Our data indicate that Xinbi processed over $19.9 billion between 2021 and 2025. The platform facilitates everything from ‘Black U’ money laundering and unlicensed OTC trades to the sale of compromised personal databases and scam infrastructure.
- The FCDO issued this designation under its Global Human Rights regime, specifically highlighting Xinbi’s support for #8 Park, an industrial-scale scam compound in Cambodia. These facilities are notorious for both large-scale pig butchering scams and the forced labor and torture of trafficked workers.
- In the face of previous takedowns, Xinbi demonstrated significant resilience by rapidly migrating to the SafeW messaging app and launching its own proprietary payment app, XinbiPay. This evolution highlights the challenges around pursuing illicit services as they build custom financial rails to insulate themselves from platform-level disruptions.
- Our data enable law enforcement, regulators, and the private sector to follow the flow of funds between Xinbi and other guarantee platforms, like Huione and Tudou. Mapping these funds flows is critical in conducting high-impact disruptions against the transnational networks enabling the global scam pandemic.
Today, the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) designated Chinese-language illicit guarantee marketplace Xinbi, a significant piece of crypto-enabled infrastructure. The UK is the first country to sanction Xinbi, which provides cryptocurrency-based services to scam centres, including #8 Park, believed to be Cambodia’s largest scam compound with the capacity to accommodate 20,000 trafficked workers. Alongside this designation, the UK has also targeted #8 Park’s owners and operators, stepping up its fight directly against the scam centres that Xinbi serves.
Beyond individual scammers, these actions also target the scam ecosystem’s on- and off-ramps that enable large-scale fraud, including pig butchering, romance scams, and investment scams. By blacklisting a well-known Chinese-language guarantee marketplace, the FCDO is addressing the commercial marketplaces that sustain scam operators with payment facilitation and marketing services. These actions by the UK Government exemplify the importance of taking an infrastructure-centric approach that targets not only individual actors, but also the escrow backbone and aggregation points connecting thousands of laundering vendors who process tens of billions of dollars in illicit crypto annually.
In recent years a global scam pandemic has grown explosively across borders and platforms, preying on victim trust and exploiting the efficient, borderless nature of crypto rails. Central to this crisis is a robust, Chinese‑language on‑chain money‑laundering ecosystem — an interconnected constellation of guarantee marketplaces, peer‑to‑peer OTCs, escrow services, and messaging‑app storefronts — that operationalizes massive fraud, enables rapid cash‑outs, and perpetuates victimization at scale. These services stitch together transactional pathways that attempt to obscure proceeds and normalize illicit commerce on‑chain, making them both resilient and lucrative for organized operators. Chainalysis is helping elevate a coordinated, international response: integrating robust data with on- and off-chain subject matter expertise to target the infrastructure that sustains this pandemic rather than only its individual perpetrators.
Xinbi: A central node in Chinese-language scam infrastructure
Like Huione Guarantee, Xinbi Guarantee operates as a peer-to-peer (P2P) marketplace, primarily hosted on Telegram, where criminal enterprises can purchase illicit goods and services with built-in escrow protections. The platform maintains a public website, which would redirect users to its Telegram channels. These guarantee services serve to manage trust between vendors and sellers, serving as an important node facilitating trusted transactions brokered by a neutral third party.
As with other guarantee platforms, Xinbi and its affiliated services support a variety of vendors and their services, underscoring the deep embeddedness of Xinbi’s services within the broader illicit ecosystem. These include money laundering entities, such as Black U services and money movement services, data vendors offering personal information and databases, suppliers of scam infrastructure, and escort services.
Our analysis indicates Xinbi has processed over $19.9 billion between 2021 and 2025 and is tightly interconnected with other illicit services. Addresses tied to Xinbi transact with other guarantee platforms such as Huione and Tudou, Telegram-based money-movement services, social media targeting vendors, and informal OTC brokers. They also receive funds directly from addresses associated with known pig butchering and compound scam operations. Xinbi’s platform permits suppliers (many of whom openly advertise scam-supporting services) to list and cross-sell.
Scam vendors commonly maintain a presence across multiple major Chinese-language guarantee platforms (e.g. Huione, Xinbi, Tudou, Pilot Guarantee) often operating on three or four marketplaces to maximize their reach and preserve continuity of operations if one service is disrupted. As depicted in the below Reactor graph, Xinbi has exposure to scam compounds and pig butchering scams. Proceeds of these scams are laundered via guarantee service and onwards using Black U services, money movement services, and unlicensed OTCs. On-chain exposure to translation services, which provide tutorials and chatbots for scammers to exploit when manipulating victims, shows Xinbi is actively facilitating scam activity rather than merely passively providing a platform for vendors to advertise on.
Earlier disruption attemptsagainst Xinbi in 2025 tested the resilience of the guarantee service and revealed how quickly it could adapt. Despite Telegram removing Xinbi’s original channels during the broader takedown action, Xinbi swiftly established new communication channels and posted updated contact information. Its website remained accessible, and on-chain data showed that Xinbi’s transaction volume remained generally stable through this disruption period.
Xinbi has since taken additional steps to insulate itself against future enforcement efforts. The service has duplicated its escrow operations on the SafeW messaging app, which markets itself as more secure — a likely attempt to mitigate the risk of another platform-level takedown. Xinbi also launched its own payment app XinbiPay, further embedding its infrastructure beyond a single platform. All of Xinbi’s services are connected on-chain, signalling an effort to build out proprietary financial infrastructure and insulate itself from disruptions against other illicit service providers.
UK continues to lead the fight against fraud and scams
These designations underscore the UK’s leadership role in combating crypto-enabled fraud by using targeted financial sanctions to disrupt the rails and marketplaces that enable large-scale scams. Notably, the FCDO issued the Xinbi designation under its Global Human Rights regime, citing Xinbi’s material support for entities that processed funds for scam centers, which have been reported to routinely perpetrate torture and other grave human rights abuses against operators and victims alike. The concurrent targeting of #8 Park and its operators further reflects the UK’s commitment to pursuing accountability across the full gamut of scam infrastructure: from the physical compounds where victims are forcibly held to the digital marketplaces that supply and sustain them.
As we recently explored, the UK has combined regulatory measures, targeted designations, and close law enforcement collaboration to make it harder for illicit actors to move, cash out, and monetize stolen crypto. Designating Xinbi demonstrates that an effective response must go beyond actions targeting individual actors to dismantle the entire platforms and infrastructure that sustain multifaceted fraud networks, precisely the kind of layered action that amplifies the impact of sanctions and law enforcement actions globally. This action underscores the UK’s growing international leadership, in mounting targeted, infrastructure-focused interventions that disrupt not only individual actors, but also the cross‑border systems that enable mass fraud.
Chainalysis is committed to high-impact disruptions
Chainalysis remains committed to support authorities in the UK and globally by providing actionable transaction-level tracing, cluster attribution, and infrastructure mapping that policymakers and investigators rely on to identify high-risk services, quantify illicit flows, and disrupt abuse of the financial system through the blockchain. Our robust analysis — from identifying intermediary wallet patterns and consolidation points to linking deposits to known threat actors and mapping vendor overlap across guarantee marketplaces — feeds the evidence base that enables hard-hitting designations, law enforcement takedowns, and international cooperation. We remain committed to sharing intelligence, improving industry compliance, and delivering training and tooling to law enforcement and regulators so that sanctions and interventions are swift, proportionate, and effective in helping stop crypto-enabled fraud.
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